

Auditing and Advancing the Cyber Security of Traffic Signal Systems

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Who Am I

- Assistant Professor, joined Wayne State in 2015
- Research in the areas of systems security, with a focus on trustworthy execution, transparent malware analysis, etc.
- PhD from George Mason University
- Mentoring COMPASS lab students
 Who sometimes listen to me...
- Father of two little ones
 - Anna, 3-year old daughter
 - Henry, 9-month baby son



Detroit Zoo on 02/18/2018



Overview

- Anatomy of a Traffic Intersection
- Attack Motivation & Considerations
- Attacks
- Defenses & Future Work



Anatomy of a Traffic Intersection


What are traffic lights? How do they work?



Traffic Intersection



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MetroCAD 2018




Traffic Signal Cabinet

- Traffic controller unit
- Traffic signal fail-safe unit
- Multiple interface cards for communication
- Relays control electrical output to light bulbs
- Two traffic signal standards
 - NEMA TS 2 Cabinet standard
 - ITS Cabinet standard




NEMA TS 2 Cabinet Standard






ITS Cabinet Standard





Traffic Control Network





Traffic Control Center





Motivation & Considerations

Why hack traffic lights?

I don't see the financial gain...





Attacks

Okay, how do I hack traffic lights?



PHYSICAL ACCESS







Okay, those are all... non-stealthy



REMOTE ACCESS



Ceaser Cerrudo and Sensys Pucks

- Cerrudo hacked unsecure Sensys vehicle detection pucks through unencrypted WIFI
- Showed that he could manipulate the minimum and maximum greendurations at intersections







Ghena and Unsecured 802.11

- Ghena found a municipality used unsecured wireless 802.11 WIFI networks to transmit data. (No Passwords)
- Found unsecured debug port on traffic controller VxWorks OS and unsecured NTCIP port.
- Proved basis for putting intersection into conflict flash on-demand (remotely)







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More Attacks





Okay, now I'm terrified to drive... How do we prevent this?












- Use least privilege principle
- Update to the latest software
- Harden the monitoring and detecting mechanisms (CMU datakey firmware should not be modifiable)



Future Work





References

- NEMA TS 2-2003 (R2008) Traffic Controller Assemblies with NTCIP Requirements Version 02.06.https://www.nema.org/Standards/ComplimentaryDocuments/Contents% 20and%20Scope%20TS%202-2003%20(R2008).pdf, 2012.
- ITS Cabinet Standard: Intelligent Transportation System (ITS) Standard Specification for Road-side Cabinets, v01.02.17a.www.ite.org/standards/atc/ITS_Cabinet_v01.02.17a.doc, 2003.
- Cesar Cerrudo. Hacking US (and UK, Australia, France, etc.) Traffic Control Systems. IOActiveBlog, 2014.
- Branden Ghena, William Beyer, Allen Hillaker, Jonathan Pevarnek, and J. Alex Halderman. GreenLights Forever: Analyzing the Security of Traffic Infrastructure. In8th USENIX Workshop on Offensive Technologies (WOOT 14), San Diego, CA, 2014. USENIX Association.



Questions?

THANK YOU!

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